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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANK NATIONALIZATION: 
THE CASE OF COSTA RICA, 1948-1988 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Luis Mesalles 
Introduction 
Suspicion of private bankers and of their power has had a 
long history. This suspicion has been especially predominant 
among social groups whose economic future depended on continued 
access to a flow of credit at relatively low cost. This was in-
deed the case for the emerging class of small entrepreneurs-cum-
technocrats-cum-poli ticians of Costa Rica after World War II. At 
that time, Costa Rica was still a very small, open, rural econo-
my, entirely dependent upon exports of coffee and bananas. Its 
small banking system reflected, in turn, the simplicity of the 
economy. The new groups, on the other hand, sought opportunities 
associated with rapid structural change and were impatient when 
faced with the constraints typical of a developing economy. In 
their eagerness, they wanted to harness the power of the state in 
order to create new economic and political opportunities. In ad-
dition, they were confident that through scientific intervention 
their efforts would not only be privately profitable but would 
also contribute to economic development at large. The private 
banks, conservative and cautious, were an obstacle in their way. 
The 1948 civil war provided them with the opportunity to nation-
alize the banks. The rationalizations and the justifications 
came afterwards, but the state monopoly in the mobilization of 
deposits from the public is still a landmark in the political 
economy scenery of Costa Rica. 
This paper examines first the background for the national-
ization. It discusses the role and ideology of the 1948 Junta, 
the ostensible objectives pursued with the nationalization, and 
the possible reasons for this interventionist measure. Next, the 
paper examines the institutional evolution of the Costa Rican fi-
nancial system. From mimicking the private banks, the state-owned 
institutions evolved into labor-dominated bureaucracies and bor-
rower-dominated sources of rents. The Central Bank, entrusted 
with the direction of the system, attempted to influence resource 
allocation through quantitative/qualitative credit restrictions, 
credit rationing, and subsidized interest rates. Political par-
ties and interest groups, in turn, attempted to control both the 
monetary authorities and the banks, in order to benefit from the 
implicit subsidies and the power that comes from the control of 
credit. Regulation was followed by avoidance, however, and both 
private banks and non-regulated intermediaries increasingly chal-
lenged the monopoly of the state-owned banks. 
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The paper includes a brief review of the main outcomes with 
respect to financial deepening, credit allocation, access to fi-
nancial services, portfolio concentration, bank efficiency and 
profitability, transaction costs, and loan collection. In each 
case a preliminary attempt is made to identify the influence of 
the nationalization on the outcomes. Recent deregulation and pri-
vatization attempts and the political economy reactions to these 
initiatives are described. The paper abandons the assumptions of 
optimal intervention analysis that consider policymakers as dis-
embodied, altruistic agents who maximize some social utility 
function and, instead, follows the •new political economy• in the 
view that the state is composed of groups of self-regarding in-
dividuals and groups in strategic interaction with private agents 
<Lal, Srinivasan>. The paper, therefore, attempts to provide a 
view of the interplay of political, economic, and social forces 
that affected the decision to nationalize the banks as well as 
the evolutiot1 of the system as the different coalitions changed 
over time. 
The Nationalization Decree 
I During a radio speech the evening of June 19, 1948 Jose Fi-
gueres, head of the Junta that ruled Costa Rica for 18 months af-
ter a two-month civil war, announced the nationalization of the 
banking system. That day, only six weeks after it took power, 
the Junta suspended the constitutional guarantees and it decreed 
a ten percent tax on capital in addition to the nationalization 
of the banks. The decision, the most important in the political 
economy history of the country during the second half of this 
century, represented a major attempt by new social groups to take 
economic and political power away from the traditional <coffee> 
exporting groups, which had so far controlled the banks, and to 
modify to their advantage the country's economic policies and 
productive structure. 
Decree 70 of the Junta stated: "Considering: <1> That within 
the organization of a modern economy, all agricultural, industri-
al, and commercial activities depend on bank credit, the alloca-
tion of which determines the progress or stagnation of the coun-
try. <2> That an economic activity of such importance should not 
be in private hands since it represents, by its own nature, a 
public function. <3> That the private banks lend not only the 
shareholders' own funds but also mobilize the country's savings, 
in the form of deposits from the public. C4> That it is unfair 
that the high profits of the banks, guaranteed by the state and 
the social order, be earned by their shareholders, who represent 
a minimal portion of the capital mobilized. Rather, these prof-
its should become national savings and their investment should be 
directed by the state. Therefore, the Junta decrees: Cl> Pri-
vate banking is nationalized. Only the state will be authorized 
to mobilize, through its own institutions, the deposits of the 
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public. (2) The shares of the Banco de Costa Rica, Banco Anglo 
Costarricense, and Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago are expro-
priated for reasons of public convenience. The state, through 
its Ministry of Economy, will take the banks over immediately. 
The form and conditions for payment of the shares will be regu-
lated afterwards. (3) The Ministry of Economy will provisionally 
keep the present form of organization of the banks and it will 
appoint their boards of directors and managers." 
The banks so expropriated by the nationalization decree were 
owned and managed by Costa Ricans. No foreign bank had operated 
in Costa Rica after the Royal Bank of Canada left in 1936, faced 
with restrictions introduced by that year's Banking Law, which 
limited dividend payments to 12 percent of equity capital (Ortu-
no>. The nationali~ation decree, therefore, had two main effects: 
Cl) it created a legal monopoly in the market for deposits from 
the public, which represented a major restriction to entry into 
banking by domestic and foreign intermediaries; and (2) it trans-
formed three of the existing private banks into state-owned en-
terprises. One small private bank <Banco Lyon> was allowed to 
continue operations, but without authority to mobilize deposits 
from the public, and it soon specialized in international tran-
sactions. The largest bank, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, created 
as a public institution in 1914, continued to be operated by the 
state. Since 1936 its Money Issuing Department had exercised the 
functions of a central bank. 
Rationale for the Nationalization 
In his radio speech, Figueras further justified the innova-
tion by indicating that "it is necessary to redirect the coun-
try's economic activities, in order to promote savings and the 
most productive use of resources. The greatest obstacle to this 
task is the prevailing organization of credit. The banks allocate 
the funds needed by agriculture, industry, and commerce. For this 
they use not only their own capital, but also the public's funds, 
in the form of deposits. This gives them the extraordinary social 
power that they enjoy and CFigueres believed> this is an incredi-
ble anachronism. The administration of money and of credit should 
not be in private hands, as the administration of water or of the 
postal system should not be left in private hands. These vital 
functions should be undertaken by the state, the nation's polit-
ical organ. Banking is the safest and most profitable business. 
In a few years the private banks have been able to accumulate re-
serves well beyond their original capital. Their profits come, 
to the largest extent, not from the lending of their own capital, 
but from the mobilization of funds from the public. If the ser-
vice is public, public must be the ownership of the institutions 
which manage it, particularly since modern economic conditions 
make all industries and activities dependent on them. The banks 
promote the entrepreneurs they want to favor and asphyxiate oth-
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ers. They control the country's economic progress and determine 
the success or failure of enterprises. Such a power should not 
be in private hands, but in the hands of the nation. The strict-
ly commercial criteria that characterizes the operation of the 
banks, although convenient for the shareholders, who make a safe 
investment when they finance imports of whisky, is not adequate 
for a country that needs to develop its agriculture and indus-
tries and which, for this purpose, possesses no other resources 
but bank credit. The economic policy of the Junta, which seeks 
the industrialization of the country and the intense utilization 
of natural resources, could not be implemented without the effec-
tive control of credit policy. In order to achieve this control 
it became necessary to nationalize the private banks" <La Nacion, 
June 22, 1948). 
Additional arguments presented by the Junta and their sup-
porters sought acceptance of this highly interventionist measure 
and revealed its ostensible objectives. These goals included: 
Cl> the selective allocation of funds to priority sectors, in or-
der to promote the diversification of the country's productive 
structure, under the assumption that a social optimum would not 
result from the banks' profit-maximization motives but could be 
achieved through appropriate credit policieSi <2> increased ac-
cess to financial services, particularly to subsidized credit, 
for large segments of the population and, especially, for new en-
trepreneurs <the "democratization" of credit>; C3> the use of ap-
parently inexpensive resources -bank deposits- to disburse loans 
at low rates of interest, in order to promote desirable activi-
ties, even if this results in losses for the banksi and C4> a re-
duction in the concentr~tion of power, a constant preoccupation 
of the Costa Rican polity. It was claimed that "the state-owned 
banks will se~ve the interests of all sectors of the economy, the 
weak and the powerful, without distinctions due to wealth, posi-
tion, or influence" and that "given its public nature, in the 
hands of the state banking will always be regulated with the only 
criterion of maximizing social welfare <Facio, Zuftiga, and Roa-
si). In general, the country's financial savings were perceived 
as a "public good" and commercial bank lending, which "creates 
money," as a natural state monopoly. 
These arguments did not differ from those expressed else-
where. In 1947 Campbell had supported the nationalization of the 
Australian banks by claiming that it "will take away from the 
handful of rich men who control the banks the power they now have 
to dictate financial policy to the nation and will vest this pow-
er in the hands of the elected representatives of the people ••. 
Nationalization of banking will benefit all sections of the Aus-
tralian community except the mere handful of wealthy parasites 
who live on the proceeds of bank usury" CMay>. Thirty-five years 
later, the nationalization of the Mexican banks was also justi-
fied on the basis of the need to break the power of the private 
financial institutions <Tello>. 
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Reasons for the Nationalization 
Jones and Mason identified four classes of reasons for the 
establishment of public enterprises: (1) ideological predilec-
tion, when the decision rests on the prior belief that certain 
forms of organization are generally preferable to others; (2) the 
acquisition or consolidation of political and economic power; (3) 
historical heritage or inertia; and (4) pragmatic responses to 
economic problems. The nationalization of the Costa Rican bank-
ing system mostly reflected a struggle for power among several 
interest groups. It was also a response to the fiscal problems 
faced by the Junta, at a time when it became necessary for the 
Junta to legitimize its continued rule. Although a state mono-
poly of insurance had been created in 1926, Costa Rica thus far 
had been characterized by laissez-faire economic policies. The 
nationalization was consistent, however, with the ideology of the 
new politicians of the Junta, who most likely selected from the 
available set those ideas that served them best <mostly those of 
the Peruvian Haya de la Torre, founder of APRA, a party which na-
tionalized that country's banks when it finally came into power 
with Allan Garcia in the 1980s). 
The immediate justification for the 1948 civil war had been 
the need to preserve the country's exceptional electoral institu-
tions, since the results of that year's presidential election had 
not been recognized by the incumbent administration. These re-
sults did not become effective until 18 months later, when the 
Junta turned power over to Ulate, the elected president. In ad-
dition, the civil war provided the opportunity to a new group of 
social-democrat politicians to gain power and to attempt a redi-
rection of the country's economic policies <Rovira>. With the 
civil war, they had a chance to control the government under ex-
ceptional circumstances. Indeed, the Junta became Executive and 
Legislative at the same time and it boldly took the opportunity 
to restructure the country's institutions. This was unusual in a 
country that had been and continues to be characterized by sus-
tained political stability and a well-ordered political system 
with strict separation of powers. The nationalization of the 
banks was their most important action. 
At that time the Costa Rican society was simple and offered 
few opportunities for entrepreneurial activity beyond coffee. The 
new groups consisted of a coalition of small industrial entrepre-
neurs, a strong rural middle class, and the urban intellectual 
petite bourgeoisie. The Junta included representatives of the 
Centro de Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales <Center for the 
Study of National Problems), which grouped young professionals 
and university professors, and of the short-lived Partido Social 
Democrata, a political party of small and medium entrepreneurs 
and professionals, which eventually became the dominant Partido 
Liberacion Nacional <PLN>. Trained at the newly-created Univer-
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sity of Costa Rica <1941>, in disciplines for which the tradi-
tional export sector generated little demand, their leaders were 
eager to use their newly-acquired knowledge to influence policies 
and to create for themselves new economic opportunities. 
The Center had been established to study national problems 
and to recommend "scientific and pragmatic" solutions. It's ide-
ology, which gradually replaced a liberal legacy of more than a 
century, was summarized by R. Facio, who claimed that "the objec-
tive of economic policy must be to increase and diversify the 
country's output: the preeminence of coffee must decline and so 
the nation's dependency on external markets ... (but) the increase 
and diversification of the national output must result from the 
stimulus, defense, and organization of small owners" <Aguilar>. 
The state must be a promoter and organizer of economic activity, 
through scientific intervention. In order to prevent the concen-
tration of power, however, the Center recommended the creation of 
autonomous institutions: decentralized public agencies in charge 
of specific services, presumably free of the influence of politi-
cal parties. With the new 1949 Constitution, the nationalized 
commercial banks became autonomous institutions. 
The Partido Social Democrata, in turn, attempted "a combina-
tion of measures to raise the standard of living and to guarantee 
the rights of the workers and the peon, to strengthen the small 
proprietors and to create new ones, to defend the small industri-
alist, the small merchant, the professional and the public-sector 
employee, and at the same time promote a general economic reacti-
vation" <Aguilar>. This enumeration of goals explicitly identi-
fied the party's new constituencies. After its creation in 1945 
this party had been active in the political arena, with much vi-
sibility, but it had not managed to amass any electoral support. 
Even after victory in the 1948 civil war and the rule of the Jun-
ta, its electoral power remained weak. In the elections for a 
Constitutional Assembly in December, 1948 this party only got 4 
out of 45 representatives. Under normal circumstances, it would 
have taken a long time before they would have made a difference. 
The civil war provided Figueres and his followers with a unique 
opportunity to exercise the control of government before their 
time and they took advantage of it <Rovira). 
While most of the members of the new groups lacked financial 
resources, bank credit had been particularly scarce during the 
1940s, as the private banks restricted lending, in collaboration 
with the Banco Nacional's efforts to control the inflationary 
pressures that resulted from the War and from extreme fiscal mis-
management <Ortufto). The nationalized banks would become, there-
by, "the most loyal friends of the new entrepreneurs" <Rovira). 
In a reply to a few protests, the Junta CG. Facio) claimed that 
"it cannot be communist a reform that promotes private property. 
The nationalization of the banks does not go against private pro-
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perty and it does not penalize private initiativei on the contra-
ry, it promotes it. The nationalization of credit will enormously 
promote private initiative, since anyone willing to produce will 
have loans at very low interest rates" <Gil). According to Gil, 
the explicit purpose of the nationalization was to redistribute 
credit, to promote new businesses, to create new entrepreneurs, 
to provide a stimulus to private activity, and to avoid, through 
careful allocation of the funds, the concentration of resources 
in a few hands. The nationalization of the banks, therefore, was 
a clear expression of the "opportunity-seeking" activities of new 
social and economic groups in an economy at the onset of a major 
structural transformation. 
The state-owned Banco Nacional had been created in 1914 in 
response to the refusal of the private banks to lend to the gov-
ernment. In 1948 the Junta faced a severe fiscal disequilibrium 
and it feared the influence the private banks would acquire if 
called upon to finance the deficit <Marten). Moreover, similarly 
to what Indira Ghandi did in India, the Junta used the national-
ization of the banks to consolidate its power <Torri). Six weeks 
after the end of a civil war fought to protect the results of an 
election, the Junta had not turned power over to president-elect 
Ulate. The Junta needed, in addition to its military victory, to 
introduce a shocking reform in order to justify its exercise of 
power. To tell the population that bank deposits and the high 
profits from banking belonged to the people was not only bound to 
have a strong propagandistic impact on large strata of public 
opinion, but it also served to signal the Junta's determination 
to use its exceptional power to transform the country <Solera). 
Indeed, Lenin, impressed by the powerful political and economic 
influence of the banks, nationalized all Russian banks immediate-
ly after the 1917 revolution as the fastest and most effective 
way of assuming control over the entire economy. 
Lack of Opposition 
While university professors and students applauded the na-
tionalization, the private sector did not attack or oppose it. 
Only La Nacion, the main conservative newspaper, openly opposed 
the measure and claimed that it is private enterprise, and not 
nationalization, which promotes economic development. The edi-
torial feared that this nationalization would place in the hands 
of the state, and in this way of those who control it, all the 
power of credit, which at any time can be used as a political 
tool. Guardia, one of the lonely dissenting voices, asked why, 
if the nationalization of the banks was such a fantastic idea, 
few other countries had attempted it. In his view, the state is 
a poor credit manager and would allocate credit with political, 
not economic criteria. He feared that those businessmen who op-
posed the rulers would not have access to loans <Gil). 
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Given its major impact, the absence of opposition to the na-
tionalization of the banks may be surprising. This passive ac-
ceptance reflected, however, the extraordinary power accumulated 
by Figueres and his followers as a consequence of the civil war 
and the fear that access to credit would be lost in the case of 
opposition. Debate about the merits of the intervention increased 
with time, nevertheless, once normality was restored, but there 
never was a chance that the measure would be reversed. There are 
historical moments when the state is reconstituted and when those 
elements that have seized the political initiative can set down 
the initial orientations of the state by devising an array of in-
stitutions which embody their ideological vision, by coalescing 
alliances to form the social foundations of the state, ·and by 
formulating a legitimation to transform their might into right 
<Bennet and Sharpe). The 1948 civil war gave the Junta the power 
to reconstitute the state, as reflected by the 1949 Constitution. 
The orientation with which they imbued key institutions became 
set in ways which delimited the future strategy of growth and 
which gradually constrained the possibility of anything but mar-
ginal changes in orientation. 
For a long time, the operations of the nationalized banks 
were not questioned. The concept of a more equitable distribution 
of credit was the screen used by the groups which actually appro-
priated most of the benefits from the nationalization to defend 
it. These groups invested so successfully in the adoption of this 
"ideology" that attacks to the nationalized banks became increas-
ingly viewed as "morally wrong." This is a role of ideology that 
has been stressed by North. While selective credit allocation 
and subsidized loans were used to compensate those who contrib-
uted to the party's progress, thus reducing the free-rider prob-
lem, promotion of the ideology was used to maintain popular con-
sent. Moreover, although credit allocation was actively used to 
increase the following of the PLN, the portfolio. of loans actual-
ly became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large 
clients. Thus, the appropriation by a few of most of the rents 
created by the nationalized banks was reconciled with the polit-
ical objective of reaching a large clientele through the imple-
mentation of special small-farmer loan programs. While these 
programs reached a large number of borrowers, they required only 
a small proportion of the amounts disbursed <Vogel, 1984). 
Private interest groups were ambivalent about the innova-
tion: they were ready to leave banking to the state so long as 
access to subsidized loans increased. The Chamber of Industries 
agreed with the Junta's objective •to increase access to produc-
tion credit under special terms and conditions" <Facio, Zuftiga, 
and Rossi>. On the other hand, the costs of organization were 
too high, compared to the potential gains from reversal of the 
borrower-dominated policies, for the groups of depositors, tax-
payers, and excluded potential borrowers hurt by the intervention 
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to oppose it <Olson). This contrasted with the belligerence of 
bank employees, who had clear interests to defend and ample op-
portunities for organization. 
Institutional Evolution of the Nationalized Banks 
Four dimensions of the institutional evolution of the Costa 
Rican banking system are worth mentioning: Cl) the gradual change 
in organizational culture, from state-owned banks which mimicked 
the private banks from which they had sprung, to labor-dominated 
bureaucratic institutions; (2) the gradual change in the degree 
of autonomy from the Executive branch enjoyed by the state-owned 
banks, which led to an increasing political intrusion; (3) the 
changing role of the Central Bank and the recent deregulation at-
tempts; and C4) the gradual emergence of evasion and avoidance 
mechanisms, which led to increasingly active non-regulated finan-
cial systems and to growing competition from private banks. 
The Junta decided to keep the expropriated private banks as 
separate institutions in order to avoid a concentration of power 
and to promote some competition. These banks, in addition to the 
Banco Nacional, became the nationalized banking system <NBS). All 
the banks benefited from immediate capital contributions from the 
state. A large transfer to the Banco Nacional, earmarked for sub-
sidized, long-term agricultural credit, was the first one of nu-
merous and substantial fiscal and donor contributions aimed at 
increasing the availability of loanable funds for target popula-
tions and end uses. The Junta also kept the old staff of the 
banks, most of whom had been loyal to Figueres. Bank employees 
had been at the forefront of the general strike that preceded the 
civil war and represented a major group among the white-collar 
middle classes that increasingly supported the PLN. The members 
of the boards of directors were also asked to retain their posi-
tions and most did <Solera). Although not much change in credit 
policies was to be expected when the directors stayed, this mea-
sure might have reflected the Junta's effort to keep the public's 
confidence in the banks. In practice, therefore, there had merely 
been a change of owner: the banks continued to operate for some 
time as if they were private commercial banks. Highly respected 
professional bankers, who knew their clientele well, continued as 
managers for a long time and maintained a considerable indepen-
dence from the political power. The 1950s were, therefore, the 
golden age for the nationalized banks, revitalized by the infu-
sions of funds and by exceptionally rapid economic growth. 
Gradually, however, the old bankers began to be replaced by 
politicians in the boards of directors and management of the in-
stitutions. The directors were appointed by the Executive branch, 
for four-year periods, while the managers were appointed by the 
boards, for similar periods. Given the alternation of different 
political parties in the control of the Executive and since one-
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half of the board was replaced every two years, each new adminis-
tration had to wait for two years before it controlled a majority 
of the board. This gave the banks considerable independence in 
those earlier years. In time, however, the appointments became 
•ore and cnor·e political rewards rather than the identification of 
a professional capacity in bank management. Appointed for only 
four years, the directors had little time and incentives to learn 
the complexities of banking and saw their position merely as an 
opportunity to advance their political career <Solera>. From 
their political rather than technical perspective, therefore, 
they were open to the influence of the Executive and their po-
litical party and vulnerable to the pressures from the private 
interest groups which they represented. Political intrusion and 
rent-seeking thus increasingly characterized their performance. 
With the election of Figueres as president in 1970, the in-
dependence of the banks sharply declined. According to the 1949 
Constitution, the four nationalized banks had become autonomous 
institutions. The Constitution defined "autonomy" as independence 
with respect to both policy and management. The purpose was to 
protect the technical operations of these institutions from pol-
itical intrusion. By the late 1960s, however, the PLN leaders 
believed that independence with respect to policy had to be taken 
away from these agencies, since it was no longer compatible with 
their desire for an increasing role of planning. The PLN-con-
trolled Legislative approved a constitutional amendment in order 
to restrict the independence of the autonomous institutions to 
matters of management only <Romero). As a result, these agencies 
had to follow the directives of the Executive. In the case of 
the banks, this influence was exercised mostly through the Cen-
tral Bank. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the monetary author-
ity had been managed by strong personalities, like Facio and So-
lera, and had enjoyed considerable independence. This autonomy 
diminished over time <Gonzalez-Vega, 1988a). 
An increasing politicization of the banks came also as a re-
sult of changes in the method of appointment of their boards .of 
directors. After 1970, appointments were made at the beginnin9 
of each administration, 4 directors chosen from the winning party 
and 3 directors from the losing party. This explicit distribu-
tion of power within the banks was a clear recognition that the 
institutions had become major redistribution mechanisms according 
to political rewards. An additional loss of independence took 
place in 1974, when a new law autborized the President to freely 
appoint and remove an Executive President for each autonomous in-
stitution, as its main executive. This has allowed the winninq 
party to centralize power and to use the banks as a political 
tool. In the case of the Central Bank, three Cabinet ministers 
were appointed as ex officio members of the board of directors. 
These ministers, in addition to the executive president, gave the 
Executive branch's representation a majority in the board. 
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With the nationalization of the banks, the control over man-
agement exercised by the private shareholders disappeared. The 
banks were supposed not to pursue profit maximization any longer, 
but a set of criteria for the evaluation of their performance was 
never defined <Lizana, 1977). The staff of the banks gradually 
filled the vacuum thus created. The number of employees at the 
banks increased from 686 in 1950 to 8,340 in 1986. This repre-
sented a rate of growth of employment at the banks twice as fast 
as for the economy as a whole. Labor unions of bank employees 
increasingly used their strength to improve their salaries and 
fringe benefits. Bank wages became much higher than those for 
equivalent occupations in other sectors, while an important pro-
portion of the banks' accounting profits was earmarked for em-
ployee fringe benefits (pension plans, country clubs, etc.). 
Rigid bureaucratic structures controlled by the unions severely 
restricted the adoption of promotion policies based on efficiency 
or performance-linked incentives to employees. 
Central Bank Policies 
In addition to the traditional monetary functions, the Cen-
tral Bank was entrusted with the direction of the NBS and the 
promotion of economic development. Ever since its creation, its 
main policy instrument were the topes de cartera, ceilings on the 
amounts of credit outstanding by economic activity. With these 
quantitative/qualitative limits on credit volumes, the authori-
ties attempted to influence both the rate of expansion of domes-
tic credit and resource allocation. The Central Bank was also 
involved in the design of rationing criteria (cuadros de avio), 
which defined maximum amounts to be financed, usually per unit of 
land, for each particular crop. These amounts were based on hy-
pothetical costs of production, uniform for the whole country, 
estimated for the best available technology. 
While the topes were used to channel credit towards priority 
sectors or to discourage lending for non-preferred activities, 
the avios were rules for loan-amount credit rationing in the pre-
sence of under-equilibrium interest rates <Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). 
Subsidized loans and special credit programs created substantial 
rents. Intense directly-unproductive, profit-seeking <DUP> ac-
tivities by interest groups followed, in order to create and cap-
ture those rents, while individuals spent resources in fulfilling 
the requirements for eligibility <Krueger, Bhagwati, Kane>. The 
politicians, in turn, used their control of the rent-generation 
process as a tool to promote contributions and support for their 
political parties and the topes and avios as selective incentives 
in order to control free riders, given the costs involved in or-
ganizing large groups, as explained by Olson. Prominent party 
members, in turn, were handsomely rewarded with privileged access 
to loans and timid efforts to collect them. 
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Over time, the shortcomings of this system became evident. 
The Central Bank's credit program contained quarterly limits on 
loans outstanding per bank, for a large number of categories 
<sometimes over 70). The multitude of often overlapping and in-
consistent ceilings became expensive for the banks to administer, 
while the Central Bank had to distract resources from its more 
traditional monetary functions to design and supervise the credit 
program. Given insufficient information and undefined criteria, 
the credit program simply reflected projections of the ceilings 
for the previous year and the requests for modifications from the 
politicians. In this environment, the establishment and imple-
mentation of the tapes became increasingly vulnerable to inter-
est-group pressures, particularly at the level of the board of 
directors of the Central Bank. Rather than a maximum of credit 
allowed per activity, the tope was interpreted as an entitlement 
which obligated the state-owned banks to lend the amount of the 
ceiling for each particular purpose. This made it difficult for 
the Central Bank to use the topes as an instrument to control the 
expansion of credit, since any reduction would imply a curtail-
ment of these "property rights.• The risk-averse banks, on the 
other hand, interpreted that they were not authorized to lend for 
a particular purpose, unless the corresponding tope line item had 
been included in the credit program. In this way the state-owned 
banks passed on the blame for the general shortage of credit to 
the monetary authorities <"we are sorry, there is no tope">, but 
still were able to accommodate preferred clients when necessary 
<"there is no tope, but we can help you">. As a result, year af-
ter year the banks essentially made the same loans, despite major 
changes in circumstances, and there was little room for innova-
ting lending. 
Given the impossibility to accurately forecast the composi-
tion of the demand for:credit, numerous revisions of the credit 
program were required during the year. Despite these modifica-
tions, the banks hardly ever complied with the regulation <Vogel 
and Gonzalez-Vega). Moreover, excess demands for credit for some 
purposes and excess supplies for others, that could not be easily 
corrected, increased the rigidity of bank management as well as 
the transaction costs for the banks and the borrowers. Soon the 
clients learned, however, to apply for loans for activities for 
which topes were available and to rely on fungibility for the im-
plementation of their desired production plans. Over the years, 
several reforms were adopted in order to minimize the deficien-
cies of the system and, in the mid-1980s, the Central Bank under-
took a major deregulation of the system, completely eliminating 
the tapes <Loria, 1988). Similar problems became evident with 
respect to the avios, particularly after inflation accelerated 
and more frequent revisions were necessary. Active rent-seeking 
efforts by interest groups attempted to influence the estimation 
of costs of production and the determination of the proportion of 
these costs to be financed. Over time, the producers interpreted 
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the amount of the avio as an entitlement to a given loan size, 
independent of individual circumstances. Given the enormous he-
terogeneity of farmers, the application of a uniform avio has re-
sulted in major inefficiencies and inequities <Graham). 
The Central Bank also set deposit and loan interest rates. 
The tope system provided ample opportunities for interest-rate 
differentiation: there was a different interest rate for each 
line item in the credit program, with a wide margin between the 
lowest and the highest rates. The implicit subsidies attracted 
rent-seeking activities. Several subsidized interest rates were 
also established by law, as an institutionalization of entitle-
ments for specific groups <rural women, cooperatives, and the 
like). Given extremely low levels of inflation, of less than two 
percent per year in the 1950s and the 1960s, however, even the 
preferential rates were positive in real terms and the implicit 
subsidy was moderate. With the acceleration of inflation in the 
1970s, on the other hand, real interest rates became negative and 
the subsidy substantial and highly concentrated in a few hands 
<Vogel, 1984). 
Until the late 1970s, the interest rates paid on deposits 
were never a concern for the authorities. With the acceleration 
of inflation and capital flight in the late 1970s, however, the 
Central Bank began to pay attention to the rewards to depositors. 
In 1978, a partial financial reform raised real interest rates to 
positive levels for a few months and a high interest elasticity 
of deposits was revealed. This reform soon failed, however, due 
to the absence of fiscal control and the resulting inflationary 
pressures <Gonzalez-Vega, 1988a). Thus, while the interest-rate 
reform stimulated deposit mobilization, the financing of the pub-
lic-sector deficit crowded out the private sector from the NBS 
credit portfolios. The explosive fiscal disequilibrium of the 
early 1980s resulted in a further acceleration of inflation. In-
terest rates, on the other hand, were not adjusted upwards suffi-
ciently and became extremely negative in real terms. The finan-
cial system experienced, as a result, a major contraction. The 
stabilization program implemented after 1982, on the other hand, 
resulted in too high real interest rates, in reflection of the 
large claim of the public sector on available resources <Gonza-
lez-Vega, 1988b). 
The Central Bank has also assumed the foreign-exchange risk 
associated with substantial flows of foreign financial assistance 
for the targeted credit programs of the state-owned banks and it 
has attempted to influence resource allocation through its redis-
counting programs, accessible only to the state-owned but not to 
the private banks. It has also diverted considerable amounts of 
funds to the public sector through its reserve-requirement poli-
cies. Numerous autonomous institutions and state enterprises 
<particularly CODESA, the development corporation that operates 
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as a holding company of state enterprises, and the CNP, a price-
stabilization agency> have become major interest groups in their 
own right and have participated in the rent-seeking activities. 
Both CODESA and the CNP have had automatic access to Central Bank 
funding. CODESA and its subsidiaries have engaged in all kinds of 
productive activities, usually reserved for the private sector: 
aluminum smelting; cement, fertilizer, sugar, and cotton produc-
tion; railroads and urban and maritime transportation; aquacul-
ture and shrimp fishing, and the like. These "productive" state 
enterprises have not been profitable, however. Between 1977 and 
1983, not one of CODESA's 12 main subsidiaries had any profits in 
any single year of the period. Their accumulated losses repre-
sented 57 percent of their assets. On the other hand, the corpor-
ation's non-restrict access to Central Bank credit, which in 1983 
represented one-half of all domestic credit for the public sector 
and 18 percent of all bank credit, was a major reason for the se-
vere crowding out of the private sector in SBN portfolios. At the 
same time, in 1983 CODESA's enterprises contributed only 1.8 per-
cent of the GDP and employed only 0.3 percent of the labor force 
<Vargas). This hybrid of state power-private flexibility Ca state 
agency created as a private corporation> has shown the worse fea-
tures of both worlds. It has not been restricted by the politi-
cal controls typical of government agencies Ce.g., legislative 
authorization of funding> or by the profit discipline that con-
strains private firms. Projects have been preferred on the basis 
of their initial investment: the larger, the better, and the Cen-
tral Bank has been called upon to automatically provide the funds 
required. 
Avoidance: Private Banks and Non-Regulated Intermediaries 
By erecting restrictions to entry, the nationalization of 
the banks was a "negative innovation," which destroyed economic 
opportunities <Kane>. Inevitably, over the years, successful 
mechanisms of avoidance flourished that restored some of those 
opportunities. In the first place, this intervention had created 
a state monopoly of deposit mobilization. Deposits were viewed 
as the raw material from which loans were produced and as an in-
put in production <"the only resource available," in Figueres' 
words>. The decree actually mandated that "only the state will 
be authorized to mobilize the deposits of the public." The first 
exception to this very general statement came with a narrow reg-
ulatory definition of "deposits" as (sight> demand and savings 
deposits only. This opened the door to the mobilization of term 
deposits by other intermediaries. Finance companies Cfinancie-
~> established to mobilize funds for six-month terms and longer 
were allowed to operate, under the condition that the liability 
instrument not be called a "deposit" but instead an investment 
certificate Ccertificado de inversion>. These finance companies 
remained relatively small for many years and their lending opera-
tions were financed, to a large extent, by inflows of foreign 
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funds. In 1963 the U. S. Agency for International Development 
CUSAID> assisted in the creation of a private financial company 
CCOFISA> with an infusion of low-priced, long-term funds. By 
1981, COFISA had borrowed abroad 25 times the US$ 10 million that 
USAID had initially provided and it had become the largest pri-
vate financial institution in the country. In the 1970s, more-
over, when inflation accelerated, the interest rates paid on de-
posits by the private financieras began to diverge from those 
paid by the state-owned banks. Successful competition for depos-
its increased the relative importance of the finance companies 
and by 1975, their assets represented about 7 percent of the to-
tal for the financial system CSagot). 
When several of the financieras grew larger, they requested 
authorization to operate as "banks," under Central Bank regula-
tion. These private banks have been allowed to perform all bank-
ing functions, except the mobilization of demand and savings de-
posits. In addition, they have been denied access to Central Bank 
rediscounting. Their interest rates have been regulated by the 
Central Bank and their term deposits have been subject to reserve 
requirements. Most of the private finance companies and private 
banks, however, created subsidiaries registered in Panama, as a 
mechanism to evade interest-rate ceilings, reserve requirements, 
and taxes. During the early 1980s these subsidiaries became very 
active in the mobilization of foreign-currency-denominated depos-
its, when they offered a convenient vehicle for currency substi-
tution <Camacho and Gonzalez-Vega). In order to compete more ef-
fectively, the state-owned banks have jointly operated their own 
foreign subsidiary, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica. Even 
today, a substantial portion of the deposits and loans of the 
private intermediaries are booked at these Panamanian subsidia-
ries. 
The role of the private banks expanded considerably in the 
1980s, due to substantial support from the USAID. This support 
reflected both the Agency's new emphasis on private-sector devel-
opment and disillusionment with the nationalized banks. A report 
issued in 1983 characterized the NBS as "slow, excessively con-
servative, and incapable of significantly contributing to the 
economic development of the country because of its implicit lend-
ing policies as well as its inability to mobilize internal sav-
ings to any significant degree" <Pratt et al.>. USAID assistance 
was facilitated by a 1984 reform of the Central Bank Law, which 
authorized private-bank access to rediscounting when the source 
of the funds is foreign. The relative importance of the private 
banks has increased rapidly. Their share in the total portfolio 
of bank credit was only 0.3 percent in 1978. This share had in-
creased to 4.6 percent by 1983, just before the USAID assistance 
escalated. By 1986, the share of the private banks in total out-
standing credit was 15.3 percent. Moreover, their share in the 
flow of new loans granted each year increased from 5.4 percent in 
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1983 to 20.1 percent in lg86. The importance of the private banks 
has been particularly pronounced in the case of industrial loans. 
By 1986, these banks granted 43.3 percent of all industrial cred-
it in the country. The expansion of the private banks has clear-
l.y reflected the m«jor role of foreign donors. in the political 
economy of a small country. 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of the NBS was not lia-
i ted to the private sector or the international donors. The auth-
orities found it necessary to create new public-sector financial 
institutions, in order to provide services not supplied by the 
state-owned commercial-cum-development banks. Savings and loan 
institutions specialized in housing finance, cooperative finan-
cial agencies, a Workers Savings Bank <Banco Popular> which mob-
ilizes forced employee savings, a municipal financial institution 
and a students' loan program are among the new mechanisms created 
<Lizana, 1977>. As a result of these institutional developments, 
the Costa Rican regulated financial system today is comprised of 
four state-owned commercial banks, 17 private commercial banks, 
56 finance companies, SO credit unions, 7 savings and loan asso-
ciations, and 7 state-owned non-bank intermediaries. The state-
owned commercial banks still accounted for 76 percent of the as-
sets of the system in 1986 <although some of the weight may be 
illusory, in light of the quality of the loan portfolio of the 
NBS>. There has been, in addition, a growing number of nonrequl-
ated finance companies. 
Recently, there has been increasing concern about the grow-
ing number and aggressiveness of these nonregulated intermedia-
ries and about the need to extend the surveillance of the Super-
intendency of Banks, attached to the Central Bank, over the ac-
tivities of private intermediaries, in response to concerns si~­
ilar to those expressed by Dooley and Mathieson. These companies 
have been offering a wide variety of savings instruments witb a 
variety of yields, ranging from 40-60 percent interest per annu.m 
on term deposits to more sophisticated activities such as manag-
ing and investing deposits of clients on short-term securities at 
the National Securities Exchange and paying 10-12 percent per an-
num on these "demand deposits" CSagot>. These concerns reached a 
climax recently, when millions of colones have been lost by de-
positors of nonregulated companies that have gone bankrupt. These 
events, in turn, have stained the image of the private financial 
intermediaries and have led to renewed demands for government in-
tervention and for measures to protect the monopoly of the NBS. 
This reaction has been unfortunate and it highlights the impor-
tance of the superintendency (Gonzalez-Vega and Zinser>. In the 
words of the manager of one of the state-owned banks, "the best 
thing that could have happened to the nationalized banks has been 
the competition from the private banks." Adequate supervision 
seems to be critical for the protection of such competition. 
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Finally, there has been an explosive growth of the National Secu-
rities Exchange <Bolsa Nacional de Valores>. Although the over-
whelming proportion of both the number and the value of its tran-
sactions has been in public-sector debt instruments, private-
sector participation in the mobilization of funds has rapidly 
grown over the past years. Placement of private paper has recent-
ly represented about 4 percent of total transactions. More than 
a market for shares, the Exchange has been a market for obliga-
tions <Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo>. The expansion of the Exchange 
has been both a reflection of regulatory avoidance as well as 
another force for privatization and increased competition in the 
financial markets of Costa Rica. 
Financial Deepening 
Costa Rica experienced sustained financial deepening during 
the 1950s and the 1960s. Financial progress, which was particu-
larly rapid during most of the 1970s, was interrupted at the end 
of the decade, however, and acute financial repression followed. 
Table 1 shows that both the money supply CM2>, in the broad sense 
of currency and demand, savings, and term deposits, as well as 
domestic credit increased rapidly, when measured in real terms, 
during the first 30 years after the nationalization. As shown in 
Table 2, the ratio of M2 to the GDP augmented from 18 percent in 
1950 to 24 percent in 1970 Cit had been 27 percent in 1969> and 
to 42 percent in 1978. Most of this process of financial deepen-
ing resulted from the growth of quasimoney, particularly in the 
1970s, as changing preferences for liquidity, risk, and returns 
led to the diversification of financial-asset portfolios. Simi-
larly, the ratio of domestic credit to the GDP increased from 22 
percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1978 <Gonzalez-Vega, 1985>. Com-
pared to other developing countries, by the late 1970s Costa Ri-
ca's indicators of financial deepening reflected a positive per-
formance. 
A difficult question refers to the extent to which financial 
deepening was facilitated or retarded by the nationalization of 
the banks. On the one hand, all of the other Central American 
countries, where the banks had not been nationalized, experienced 
similarly vigorous financial progress <Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo>. 
This was everywhere produced by price and exchange-rate stability 
which made, during most of the period, the real returns to domes-
tic financial assets positive. In the case of Costa Rica, finan-
cial deepening also reflected rapid and sustained economic growth 
and political stability. Despite financial deepening, however, 
Costa Rica's domestic savings ratio has been particularly low and 
the country has relied heavily on foreign savings for the financ-
ing of domestic investment. 
On the other hand, the nationalization led to an expansion 
of the network of bank branches well beyond what could have been 
expected otherwise, while the idea that the state-owned banks 
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cannot go bankrupt might have promoted depositor confidence. At 
the time of the nationalization there were 43 bank branches in 
Costa Rica, one for every 20,000 inhabitants. Of these, more-
over, 38 belonged to the state's Banco Nacional <Hess). By 1986, 
on the other hand, there were 248 bank branches in the count~y, 
namely, one for every 10,000 persons. This is the third lowest 
ratio of population to bank branches in Latin America, after Uru-
guay and Trinidad and Tobago. A large proportion of these bank 
offices are rural branches (Juntas Rurales), which have made pos-
sible a greater penetration of the countryside than in other dev-
eloping countries <Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo>. The monopoly of the 
mobilization of deposits enjoyed by the NBS, however, has been 
reflected by a poor service to the depositors of the state-owned 
banks, who have had to incur in high transaction costs. The•~ 
costs have discouraged many from holding financial assets. Fi-
nancial deepening in Costa Rica seems to have been, therefor~, 
more the result of appropriate macroeconomic policies that main-
tained price stability for a long time than of explicit concerns 
with financial intermediation, and particularly with deposit mob-
ilization, by the nationalized banks. When macroeconomic manage-
ment failed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the system rapidly 
collapsed. Nationalization, per se, seems to have had a mixed, 
possibly negative impact, on the process of financial deepening. 
In particular, it prevented the development of a more integrated 
financial mar-ket, where an appropriate institutional division of 
labor would have resulted in a more efficient provision of all 
types of financial services. 
Fiscal Crises and Financial Repression 
The Costa Rican financial system suffered a significant blow 
with the fiscal crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given 
the increasing discrepancy between public-sector revenues and ex-
penditures and the loss of access to foreign financial markets, 
the fiscal deficit was increasingly financed with domestic bank 
credit. The rapid expansion of domestic credit made it impossible 
to sustain the fixed exchange rate and led to the loss of inter-
national monetary reserves, to accelerating inflation, and to de-
valuation. The resulting financial repression produced a signif-
icant contraction of the banking system. Table 1 shows negative 
real rates of growth for all major money and credit aggregat~s 
for the 1978-1982 period. In real terms, by 1982 the money sup-
ply in the broad sense CM2> represented only 69 percent of its 
1978 value, while the money supply in a na+row sense <Ml) repre-
sented only 56 percent of its 1978 value. Similarly, by 1982 re-
al domestic credit amounted to only 42 percent of its 1980 value. 
The most dramatic contraction took place with respect to domestic 
credit for the private sector which, by 1982 represented only 36 
percent of the 1978 level. Domestic credit for the public sector, 
on the other hand, continued to increase until 1980, but it even-
tually declined. By 1982, credit for the public sector reached 
only 46 percent of its 1980 level <Gonzalez-Vega, 1988b>. 
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As claimed by Gonzalez-Vega C1988a>, the difficulties were 
essentially a crisis of the public sector and reflected a mis-
judgment about the appropriate size and composition of govern-
ment. In turn, the hyperexpansion of the public sector resulted, 
in the general manner explained by Lal, from the proliferation of 
entitlements to income transfers for a multitude of interest 
groups. These entitlements, which grew well beyond sustainable 
levels, reflected the overall nature of Costa Rica's political 
economy environment <Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes>. Interest-rate 
subsidies and foreign-exchange subsidies granted through the NBS 
represented a major proportion of these entitlements. Once the 
coffee boom of the mid-i970s was over, these transfers had to be 
financed with domestic bank credit. A major crowding out of the 
private sector in the portfolios of the NBS was the consequence. 
Table 2 reports that the ratio of credit for the private sector 
to the GDP declined from 29 percent in 1978 to 18 percent in 
1986, while the ratio of credit for the public sector to the GDP 
steadily increased. Also, as shown in Table 3, the share of the 
private sector in total domestic credit declined from 86 percent 
in 1970 to 49 percent by 1986. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the 
public sector received about two-thirds of the net annual addi-
tions to domestic credit. Autonomous agencies and public enter-
prises, such as CODESA and the CNP, became powerful interest 
groups in the struggle for declining credit volumes. In the end, 
however, inflation was the easy winner and credit for the public 
sector measured at constant prices declined 
All of the Central American financial systems have been in 
the midst of an acute crisis during the 1980s. To a large extent, 
the difficulties have resulted from the same causes, both exter-
nal and domestic. The contraction of the banking system was more 
pronounced in Costa Rica, however, than in the other countries 
<Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo). The nationalization of the banks seems 
to have contributed to the magnitude of this collapse. The na-
tionalization facilitated both the proliferation of implicit sub-
sidies that was at the fiscal root of the crisis as well as the 
acute crowding out of the private sector from credit portfolios. 
Numerous public-sector agencies exercised senior claims on the 
available loanable funds, leading to the exclusion of private 
clientele. Influential borrowers linked to political parties and 
powerful interest groups were rationed the least. The national-
ization also resulted in a poor service to depositors and, there-
fore, in greater incentives for currency substitution and the ac-
cumulation of inflation hedges. Many depositors feared a freeze 
of their accounts, particularly after the Mexican experience. 
With high inflation and devaluation expectations during the cri-
sis, the mobilization of domestic funds through the NBS rapidly 
shrunk. Moreover, the rigidity of the NBS not only contributed 
to the crisis, but it has jeopardized the rapid fecovery of the 
economy as well, in view of obsolete financial technologies and 
bureaucratic procedures. 
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Agricultural Credit and Access to Financial Services 
In many respects, for a long time Costa Rica has been a suc-
cess story with respect to agricultural credit. The authorities 
became interested in small-farmer credit in 1914, when the Banco 
Nacional was created. At that time, the Cajas Rurales were or-
ganized, "to liberate the small farmers from the usurious condi-
tions of moneylender loans, and to stimulate production of basic 
grains for domestic consumption." After one year, 27 Cajas had 
been established and were lending to 1,000 farmers the equivalent 
of 15 percent of the bank's portfolio. In 1936, the Cajas became 
the Juntas Rurales and the concept of credit allocation through a 
local board of neighbors was maintained <Gonzalez-Vega, 1973). 
By 1948, when the private banks were nationalized, the ~ 
tas had already become a major instrument of the government's ag-
ricultural policies. Of the 157,146 loans granted between 1937 
and 1952, only 36 loans had not been repaid. Of the equivalent of 
US$ 18 million disbursed during the same period, default amounted 
to only US$ 2,390. This was a most impressive repayment record 
by any standards. It reflected the character of Costa Rican farm-
ers, a tradition of respect for contracts and for legal institu-
tions, and the creditworthiness-evaluation practices of the local 
boards. This role did not change with the nationalization. In 
1952, the 38 Juntas in operation authorized 19,994 loans, for the 
equivalent of US$ 3.7 million. What is surprising, as shown in 
Table 5, is that the number of new loans grant~d every year did 
not increase beyond 20,000 until the mid-1970s. On the contrary, 
the number of loans averaged 17,433 per year during the 1950s and 
15,525 per year during the 1960s. This number had declined to 
11,996 by 1969. In the 1970s, moreover, the number of new loans 
grew mostly as a consequence of major donor programs, particular-
ly from the USAID, targeted toward small farmers. After a max-
imum of 24,284 loans was reached in 1976, during the coffee boom, 
the number of new loans from the Juntas declined again and in the 
early 1980s it was well below the numbers already reached in the 
early 1950s. Therefore, small-farmer access to credit, measured 
by the number of Junta Rural new loans granted each year, did not 
increase significantly after the nationalization. Moreover, for 
a long time the small-farmer credit programs of the other nation-
alized banks were insignificant compared to the Juntas Rurales. 
Costa Rican farmers have enjoyed, however, a comparatively 
ample access to credit. The proportion of farmers with access to 
bank loans has been above 30 percent. If bank credit delivered to 
coffee producers through the benef icios is included in formal 
credit, this proportion has been close to an exceptionally high 
45 percent. These outcomes, however, have been the result of in-
stitutional innovations <the Juntas Rurales> that preceded the 
nationalization of the private banks, of the widespread ownership 
of titled land among farmers <distribution of property rights), 
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and of the generalized process of financial deepening enjoyed by 
the country. On the other hand, at present the private banks 
operate only a few branches outside San Jose. Although this may 
reflect their recent establishment, public ownership of the Banco 
Nacional has possibly been the most important determinant of the 
extension of its network of branches and, thereby, of its cover-
age of a wide rural clientele. This may be a reason to promote 
other financial intermediary types and not only commercial banks, 
but it is not a justification for the nationalization of the en-
tire banking system. 
In real terms, the total flow of credit granted each year by 
the Juntas Rurales grew until the mid-1960s and it then stagnated 
and declined, as shown in Table 5. By the mid-1980s, the purchas-
ing power of these loans was equivalent to their real value dur-
ing the mid-1950s. Average size of loan grew until the late 1960s 
and it then declined. By 1986, this average size was equivalent, 
in real terms, to the levels observed in the mid-1950s, despite 
substantial growth of farm incomes and credit demands. This evo-
lution corresponded to the diminishing share of the Juntas Rura-
les in the portfolio of the Banco Nacional, as shown in Table 6. 
In effect, this share dropped from 21 percent in 1970 to 6 per-
cent in 1982, at the worst moment of the crisis. 
The reduction of the portfolio share of the Juntas Rurales 
reflected the iron law of interest-rate restrictions CGonzalez-
Vega, 1984>. First with the acceleration of inflation after 1973 
and the accompanying increasing transfers implicit in subsidized 
credit and afterwards with the contraction of the availability of 
real loanable funds as a consequence of the fiscal crisis, the 
proportion of the loan portfolio allocated to marginal clientele, 
even in a nationalized banking system, shrunk. In the case of 
the Juntas the reason, however, was not a greater risk associated 
with small farmers, as predicted for profit-maximizing institu-
tions. It has been shown that in Costa Rica small farmers have 
always had good repayment records <Vogel, 1981>. In the political 
economy context of the nationalized banking system, on the con-
trary, the state-owned banks were forced to sustain the supply of 
credit for the larger and influential borrowers, despite their 
poorer repayment records, at the expense of the more punctual 
small borrowers. Table 6 shows that after inflation accelerated 
and real interest rates became negative, the average size of loan 
in the Commercial Department of the Banco Nacional, which serves 
large borrowers, grew from 5.6 times the average size of small-
farmer loans in 1971 to 12.8 times in 1975. Indeed, as predicted 
by the iron law, between 1971 and 1975 the real average size of 
the small-farmer loans declined by 43 percent, while the average 
size of Departamento Comercial loans increased by 40 percent dur-
ing the same period. This contrast was even more pronounced dur-
ing the crisis of the early 1980s. 
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Implicit Subsidies and Portfolio Concentration 
Compared to other developing countries, the nationalized 
banking system of Costa Rica has provided access to credit for a 
large proportion of the population. Access to deposit facilities 
and to other financial services has been less frequent. A survey 
of agricultural borrowers from the Banco Nacional found that, al-
though on the average these farmers had been clients of the in-
stitution for more than nine years, only 17 percent had checking 
accounts, 25 percent held savings accounts, and 5 percent had 
term deposits with any of the four nationalized banks <Gonzalez-
Garita, 1986). The emphasis on credit rather than deposits has 
been a characteristi<= ~f public development banks that have en-
joyed ample access to Central Bank and donor funds <Bourne and 
Graham). It is consistent with the political economy of the na-
tionalization and with the desired use of credit as a political 
tool. An ample availability of loans helps political parties to 
stay in power. The rent-seeking activities of influential inter-
est groups, on the other hand, will tend to concentrate credit 
portfolios in a few hands. This will reflect the superior organ-
izational capacity of small and homogeneous groups for collective 
action, as explained by Olson. These groups will be represented 
in the boards of directors of the banks and will have a dispro-
portionate influence on the process of credit rationing. They 
will make sure that a wide tope is always available and that the 
avios not only finance a high proportion of potential costs, but 
are frequently revised upwards. 
The state-owned banks of Costa Rica have been a relatively 
successful instrument for these purposes. On the one hand, they 
have provided access to loans for large numbers of producers. 
Through loan-size credit rationing it has been possible to ser-
vice many borrowers with the available loanable funds, although 
an unsatisfied demand for credit at the prevailing interest rates 
has been prevalent <Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). The multitude of bank 
customers, on the other hand, have elected the politician-entre-
preneurs who have captured the lion's share of the credit port-
folios and of the implicit subsidies. As shown by Vogel <1984>, 
despite the nationalization of the banks, there has been a hi9h 
concentration of credit portfolios in Costa Rica. The distribu-
tion of loans by size has been more unequal than the distribution 
of land or the distribution of income. Moreover, as shown in 
Table 4, concentration has been increasing, as would be predicted 
by the iron law of interest-rate restrictions. In 1974, l•ss 
than 10 percent of the number of borrowers received more than 80 
percent of the amounts disbursed for agriculture by the Baqgo 
Nacional. In 1981, when real interest rates became particularly 
negative, less than 10 percent of the borrowers received more 
than 90 percent of the amounts <Loria, 1982>. Similar concen-
tration has characterized also other portfolio components and 
other state-owned banks. 
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As a consequence of this concentration, few have benefited 
from most of the implicit interest-rate subsidy, particularly 
during inflationary periods when the real rates of interest on 
loans have become negative. As an example, under the conserva-
tive assumption that the social opportunity cost of the funds was 
10 percent per year, in real terms, the rate effectively charged 
on loans during 1974 was a negative -20 percent. Thus, the im-
plicit rate of subsidy was 30 percent. Agricultural credit re-
presented close to 60 percent of the value added in agriculture 
and over one-half of the loan portfolio of the banks. This meant 
that, in the important case of agriculture, the grant transferred 
through subsidized credit was equivalent to 20 to 25 percent of 
value added in the sector. On the other hand, only between 30 
and 40 percent of the agricultural producers had access to bank 
loans, while the remaining 70 percent were excluded. In addi-
tion, there was a high degree of portfolio concentration. In the 
case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which granted over one-
half of all agricultural credit in the country, less than two 
percent of the borrowers accounted for over 60 percent of the 
amounts loaned, as shown in Table 4. This meant that less than 
one percent of the agricultural producers of Costa Rica received 
more than 60 percent of the agricultural credit granted by the 
banks and over 60 percent of a substantial subsidy, equivalent to 
almost 25 percent of the value added in agriculture in 1974. In 
addition, by the end of the decade it was estimated that about 50 
percent of the loan portfolio of the banks represented defaulted 
loans. There was a significant transfer on this count, too, to 
the few privileged very large borrowers who did not repay their 
loans. 
Credit Allocation 
At the time of the nationalization of the banks, only 31 
percent of their portfolio was devoted to agricultural and in-
dustrial loans. The proportion of agricultural loans was already 
higher than the average for Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s 
<Gonzalez-Vega, 1988c). Over the years, however, this proportion 
at least doubled, to become the highest for Latin America, as 
shown in Tables 8 and 10. On the other hand, the share of crops 
in credit outstanding declined, from 47 percent in 1957 to 20 
percent in 1979, while the share of industry increased from 10 
percent in 1958 to 32 percent in 1985. These changes in portfolio 
composition reflected both the structural transformation of the 
country after the adoption of the impQrt-substitution strategy of 
industrialization and the relative strength of the manufacturing 
interest groups that had promoted the protectionist strategy. 
The political power of the ranchers was also reflected in the 
rapid growth of the share of credit for livestock, which grew 
from 12 percent of the total in 1958 to 30 percent in 1973. The 
larger shares of credit portfolios devoted to loans for "produc-
tive" purposes after the nationalization may be interpreted as an 
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indicator of the successful achievement of the goal to modify the 
allocation of credit towards a socially more efficient pattern. 
However, there is a substantial discrepancy between the stated 
use of the loan funds and the marginal change in economic 
activity, given the fungibility of credit. In view of the char-
acteristics of the tope system, there were strong incentives to 
request loans for purposes for which topes were available. Fur-
thermore, given the ample access to credit for the larger pro-
ducers, the opportunities for marginal substitutions seem to have 
been ample. To the extent to which the loans were granted with 
political rather than technical criteria, credit deviation and 
fungibility seem to have been substantial CLizano, 1977>. In 
these circumstances, on the one hand it becomes impossible to 
evaluate the use of the loanable funds, while on the other hand 
one suspects that many loans were not used for socially-optimum 
purposes. 
Borrowing Costs 
What matters for the borrower's investment and production 
decisions is the total cost of the funds. In addition to interest 
payments, these cost includes explicit expenses, such as bank 
fees and commissions; taxes and legal expenditures; the borrow-
er's transportation, lodging, and food costs during trips to the 
bank; and bribes. Implicit costs include the value of the time 
spent in completing loan transactions. Lack of timeliness and 
insufficient loan amounts are also costly. Delays in disburse-
ment result in lower yields, while too small loans make comple-
mentary funds from other sources and the additional transaction 
costs inevitable. Loans from the NBS have been expensive, dis-
bursed late, and insufficient <Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Gari-
ta >. 
Gonzalez-Garita Cl986> measured the level and components of 
non-interest borrowing costs for Costa Rican farmers from survey 
data for 394 clients of the Banco Nacional who borrowed, during 
1983, from one of ten selected branches. Since many producers do 
not demand loans when the transaction costs are high, the exclu-
sion of potential borrowers from market participation because of 
too high costs was not observed by this survey of borrowers. Sim-
ilarly, long distances and limited access, due to the absence of 
roads or their poor condition, prevented the completion of some 
of the interviews in the sample. These clients do incur in high 
transaction costs, precisely for the same reasons. As a conse-
quence, there was an underestimation of borrowing costs. A de-
tailed questionnaire measured fees and commissions, taxes and do-
cument costs, and travel expenses <weighted in the case of mul-
tipurpose trips). The interview also generated information to 
impute the opportunity cost of the time of the borrower and of 
those acting on his behalf. For these purposes the minimum wage 
in agriculture was used1 which underestimated true time costs. 
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The average level of the non-interest costs of borrowing was 
high, as shown in Table 11. It amounted to 6.8 percent of loan 
size and, when adjusted for loan term, it was equivalent to 11.5 
percent per year. Since average interest rates were 13.6 percent, 
the total cost of the funds was at least 25 percent per year. 
This high level was surprising, given the small size of the coun-
try, the extension of the network of roads and bank branches, and 
the development objectives of the NBS. On the average, therefore, 
interest payments represented 54 percent of the total cost of the 
funds. In the case of smaller borrowers (less than US$ 200>, how-
ever, interest accounted for only 25 percent of total borrowing 
costs, while for larger borrowers CUS$ 10,000 and over> interest 
accounted for 86 percent of these costs. More notable was the 
dispersion of the non-interest borrowing costs. While interest 
rates ranged between 8 and 30 percent per year, non-interest 
costs ranged between 0.2 and 117.5 percent per year. The total 
cost of the funds ranged between 10.8 and 129.5 percent per year, 
compared to an annual rate of inflation of 26 percent. There was 
a four-fold difference among interest rates and a 600-fold dif-
ference among the non-interest costs of borrowing. Non-interest 
borrowing costs per colon declined rapidly with loan size, from 
37 percent for loans of less than US$ 200, to 2.8 percent for 
loans above US$ 1,000. 
The existence of the trade-off between the interest and non-
interest costs of borrowing was confirmed. Underequilibrium in-
terest rates generated excess demands for credit that required 
strict rationing criteria <more complex procedures, additional 
steps, and waiting> and thereby increased borrowing costs. The 
strict end-use targeting for the funds, supervision, and eligi-
bility requirements also increased borrowing costs <Graham>. Bor-
rowing costs were higher in the case of small, basic-grain pro-
ducers than for export-oriented farmers, and when the collateral 
was a cosigner rather than a mortgage. The positive elasticity 
of borrowing costs with respect to distance suggested the poten-
tial social gains from a further geographical expansion of the 
branch network and from a reduction of the required number of 
trips to the branch. The 394 borrowers interviewed made 3,675 
trips to the branches, with a total duration of 14,700 working 
hours. This represented an average of 4.5 full working days for 
the client, usually at the time of planting. The average number 
of trips was 9.3 per borrower, and it ranged between 1 and 19 
trips per loan. Borrowing costs were higher with those with 
previous delinquency records and lower for those who were also 
depositors in the bank, as shown in Table 11. The nationaliza-
tion of the banks seems to have had a mixed impact on farmer ac-
cess to credit. By promoting an unprecedented expansion of the 
network of rural branches, it reduced borrower transaction costs. 
Interest-rate subsidies, excessive targeting, bureaucratic pro-
cedures, and X-inefficiency attributable to the nationalization, 
on the other hand, have sharply increased transaction costs. 
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Intermediation Costs and Bank Profitability 
The debate between the advocates of public enterprise on the 
one hand and of private firms on the other has been going on for 
a long time. The issues are complex and no definitive answers 
have been obtained. Differences between the two types of organ-
ization are related, among other things, to the constraints im-
posed on managers by the external capital markets, to the incen-
tives that result from the internal organization of the firm, and 
to the behavior of management <Waterson>. The impossibility to 
transfer the rights of ownership in the state-owned banks leads 
to a weaker linkage between management performance and rewards 
which, in turn, reduces efficiency. In a comparison between pri-
vate and state-owned banks in Australia, Davies concluded that 
the "managers of government-owned banks hold a higher proportion 
of their bank's assets in low-risk and low-paying investments 
than do they private counterparts. They also arrange their bank's 
affairs so that they have easier, less arduous lives. Their firms 
grow more rapidly and have larger staffs than privately organized 
enterprises. Public managers also organize work and workers less 
effectively than do private managers. This result is reflected 
in the substantively lower profit rates manifested in the public 
sector." There has been a growing consensus that most of these 
features, with some qualification with respect to the treatment 
of risk, have characterized the Costa Rican nationalized banks. 
The private banks were nationalized explicitly to eliminate 
the profit-maximization motive from their objective function. 
Over the years the banks have earned, indeed, a minuscule rate of 
return on their capital, even after accrued interest not actually 
received on delinquent loans has been included as part of their 
accounting earnings. When losses due to defaulted loans are con-
sidered, they have incurred in substantial losses most of the 
time. As a result, in real terms their capital declined by 54 
percent between 1966 and 1976 and by an additional 57 percent be-
tween 1976 and 1983. By 1985, in real terms the accounting cap-
ital and reserves of the NBS represented only 60 percent of the 
1966 level <Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). If defaulted loans were 
written off, the reduction in capital would be even greater. The 
losses, moreover, have not been due to relatively narrow finan-
cial margins. On the contrary, they have reflected extremely 
high intermediation costs in the presence of wide bank margins. 
When these costs are added to those imposed on depositors and 
borrowers, it is clear that the nationalization of the banks has 
required a substantial use of resources for the completion of 
financial transactions. This has been a waste that the country 
could ill afford. 
As shown in Table 12, non-financial intermediation costs at 
the Banco Nacional represented 6.3 percent of the effective vol-
ume of funds mobilized, net of reserve requirements. When ac-
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crued interest not effectively earned was added, the gross margin 
required for zero profits was 10.2 percent of the effective mob-
ilization. Deposit-mobilization costs represented 2.2 percent 
and lending costs 4.1 percent of effective mobilization. The bank 
earned 18.3 percent as accrued interest on its loans and invest-
ments and paid 10.3 percent on the funds mobilized. This left the 
bank with a margin of 8.0 percentage points to cover intermedia-
tion costs and losses due to default. Transaction costs of 10.2 
percent resulted, therefore, in a loss of 2.1 percent as a pro-
portion of effective mobilization. When the reserves against de-
fault, depreciation, and staff layoff payments are added, the 
losses amounted to 4.4 percent of the total mobilization of funds 
<Gonzalez-Garita, 1987>. Another study claimed that the differ-
ence between the average loan and deposit interest rates at the 
state-owned banks was 11.3 percent, compared to 3.9 percent at 
the private banks CSagot). 
Political Economy of Liberalization, Default and Rescheduling 
Since 1984 the Central Bank, under the leadership of Eduardo 
Lizana, has slowly undertaken a financial reform. The topes were 
gradually eliminated and the state-owned banks were given greater 
independence in the setting of their interest rates. The scope of 
credit subsidies was specifically defined and limited. Automatic 
access to Central Bank credit by CODESA and other autonomous in-
stitutions was eliminated. An increasing scope was provided for 
the private commercial banks to compete with the nationalized 
banks. The Central Bank attempted to regulate monetary expansion 
with reserve requirements and open market operations, rather than 
quantitative credit restrictions, as explained by Lizano <1987>. 
Lizano's strategy had been to introduce the reforms gradual-
ly and slowly in order to minimize political opposition. Gradual-
ism, however, allowed time for those hurt by the elimination of 
the subsidies to combine and exert increasing pressure for the 
reversal of the policy reforms. Opposition came, in particular, 
from the agricultural sector, which had recently enjoyed substan-
tial price, credit, insurance, and other subsidies. As Mesalles 
discusses, the situation became politically sensitive when severe 
droughts and a reductions in the international price of several 
export crops created a crisis in the agricultural sector. While 
Lizana managed to obtain support for his reforms, agricultural 
lobbies obtained legislation to reschedule most delinquent agri-
cultural loans at subsidized interest rates. The organizational 
deficiencies of the nationalized banks and the political economy 
environment had led the banks not to focus their institutional 
capacity to deal with risk in lending decisions <Von Pischke). 
Substantial portions of the portfolio became overdue, as a con-
sequence, during the 1980s. 
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The rescheduling legislation CFODEA> which mandated debt re-
lief for delinquent agricultural borrowers was enacted by unanim-
ity. The implicit subsidy is substantial and it is h~avily con-
centrated in favor of large farmers. In the case of the Banco 
Nacional, of the 12,593 farmer with rescheduled loans, 10,461 are 
smaller borrowers <less than US$ 20,000 in total borrowing), but 
they account for only 26 percent of the amounts rescheduled. An-
other 1,508 farmers <with total borrowing between US$ 20,000 and 
US$ 70,000) account for 30 percent of the total amount delinquent 
and 624 clients (with borrowing above US$ 70,000) are responsible 
for 44 percent of the arrears. A similar distribution character-
izes the delinquent portfolio of the other state-owned banks. Un-
der the assumption of a rate of inflation of 20 percent per year 
during the 16 years of the rescheduling, the present value of the 
implicit subsidy amounted to US$ 20 million. With the rate of 
inflation at 40 percent, this subsidy is equivalent to US$ 30 
million. About five percent of the beneficiaries <the largest 
delinquent borrowers> will capture between 30 and 40 percent of 
this massive transfer of income <Mesalles). This has been one of 
the most impressive examples of the power of the rent-seeking 
interest groups within a nationalized banking system. 
Conclusions 
Most of the literature on government intervention in banking 
has been c~ncerned with the benefits from the correction of 
market failures, that would lead private bankers to behavior in-
compatible with social-welfare maximization, and with the costs 
that occur as a result of organizational failure, such as the 
failure of public banks to minimize intermediation costs <Bra-
verman and Guasch). This paper has taken a different, political 
economy approach. It claims that the decisions that shape the 
behavior of the nationalized banks are not made by neutral so-
cial-welfare maximizers concerned only with economic growth, but 
by individuals representing particular group interests and having 
broader political objectives <Ahmad). The nationalized banks of 
Costa Rica have been only one of the arenas in which contending 
forces have played their quest for economic and political power. 
One of the most important ostensible reasons for the nationaliza-
tion of the banks in 1948 was the desire to separate the economic 
power of the banks from the political power of the traditional 
exporting groups. To a large extent, this goal was achieved. 
The more general objective of separating economic from political 
forces in the banking arena, however, was not accomplished. This 
paper has illustrated how political intrusion has increasingly 
characterized the evolution of the NBS. Economic and political 
power have been joined again, this time in different hands. 
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Table 1. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Money and Credit Aggre-
gates. Average Annual Rates of Growth in Real Terms. <Per-
centages). 1950-1986. 
1950-62 1962-70 1970-78 1978-82 1982-86 
Net Domestic Credit 10.2 5.5 11.1 -17.7 18.1 
Net Public Sector 4.6 8.7 20.6 -7.7 22.8 
Private Sector 11.3 5.1 8.8 -22.6 14.0 
Other Net Domestic Assets 6.9 8.9 20.4 46.3 14.2 
Total Liquidity CM2> 8.8 7.6 13.8 -8.9 10.4 
Quasi money 11.4 8.3 21.0 -5.6 8.9 
Money <MU 7.7 7.2 8.5 -13.6 12.8 
Foreign Borrowing by Banks n.a. 7.9 19.0 16.5 30.8 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index. 
Table 2. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Ratios of Money and 
Credit Aggregates to the GDP. <Percentages>. 1950-1986. 
1950 1962 1970 1978 1982 1986 
Net Domestic Credit 21. 6 30.2 28.9 40.5 33.1 36.3 
Net Public Sector 4.6 3.4 4.1 11.1 14.4 18.4 
Private Sector 17.0 26.8 24.7 29.4 18.7 17.8 
Total Liquidity CM2> 18.4 21. 8 24.4 41. 6 51.0 42.6 
Quasi money 4.4 7.0 8.3 22.9 32.4 25.7 
Money CMU 14.0 14.8 16.1 18.7 18.6 16.9 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
I, 
Table 3. Costa Rica: i.a:tional 8ankin9 System. Composition of Money 
and Credit Aggregates <Percentages>. 1950-1986. 
1950 1962 1970 1978 1982 1986 
Net Domestic Credit 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1-00.0 
Public Sector 21.1 11.3 14.3 27.5 43.4 50.·8 
Private Sector 78.9 88.7 85.7 72.5 56.6 49 . .2 
Total Liquidity <M2> 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.() 
Quasi money 24. o. 32.2 33.9 55.1 63.6 60 •. 2 
Money CMl> 76.0 67.8 '66. 1 44.9 36.4 39.8 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, ~redito 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
Table 4. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Size Distribution 
of Agricultural Credit <Cumulative Percentages>. 
1974 and 1981. 
Size 1974 1981 
<CR$> Number Amount Number Amount 
Less than 1,000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
From 1,001 to 5,000 89.89 99.82 97.50 100.00 
From 5,001 to 15,000 47.61 96.68 70.50 99.20 
From 15,001 to 50,000 22.83 90.83 33.80 96.20 
From 50,001 to 100,000 8.52 80.98 13.50 91. 30 
From 100,001 to 500,000 4.50 73.44 8.70 88.20 
From 500,001 to 1, 000, 000 1.19 55.60 3.40 77.80 
Over 1,000,000 0.70 46.43 2.20 70.10 
Sources: Vogel <1984) and Loria (1982>. 
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Table 5. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Depart1ent of Rural Credit. Nu1ber, A1ount, and 
Average Size of New Loans Granted during the Year and of Balances Outstanding 
at the end of the Year. 1950-1986. 
NEii LOANS OUTSTANDING BALANCES 
Nu1ber of A1ount Average Size Nu1ber of A1ount Average Size 
Year Loans ('000 1978 CR$l C1978 CR$J Loans ('000 1978 CR$J Cl978 CR$l 
1950 17,752 57,705.2 3,250.6 21,547 67,763.4 3,144.9 
1951 19,403 69,606.4 3,587.4 23,712 90,231.0 3,805.3 
1952 19,994 90,293.3 4,516.0 24,998 112,642 .5 4,506.1 
1953 18,006 91,563.1 5,085.1 24,794 123,548.5 4,983.0 
1954 16,838 89,049.0 5,288.6 24,877 124,429.2 5,001.8 
1955 16,967 94,466.9 5,567.7 26,456 138,199.0 5,223.7 
1956 17,625 108,824.2 6,174.4 n.a. 164,089.2 n.a. 
1957 16,675 105,346.4 6,317.6 28,187 168,917.2 5,992.7 
1958 15,275 102,263.1 6,694.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1959 15,797 118,416.7 7,496.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1960 15,989 157,818.2 9,870.4 28,075 229,403.6 8, 171.1 
1961 16,007 142,549.9 8,905.5 n.a. 268,006.3 n.a. 
1962 19,293 216,560.8 11,224.8 35,190 339,040.4 9,634.6 
1963 16,107 165,065.9 10,248.1 36,071 350, 911.8 9,728.4 
1964 16,209 199, 551.1 12,311.1 37,732 382,531. 7 10,138.1 
1965 17,767 242,230.3 13,633.7 41,218 469,136.7 11,381.8 
1966 11, 791 138,314.4 11,730.5 39,141 436,070.1 11, 141.0 
1967 16,063 210,346.6 13,095.1 39,964 443,510.2 11,097.7 
1968 14,037 180,407.8 12,852.3 38,465 433,441.3 11,268.5 
1969 11,996 184,599.8 15,388.4 37,252 440,892.1 11,835.4 
1970 13,148 193,643.9 14, 728.0 38,015 454,415.7 11,953.6 
1971 17,965 274,366.8 15,272.3 41,992 502, 971.1 11,977.8 
1972 15,825 243,398.7 15,380.6 43,085 501,468.8 11,639.1 
1973 16,208 260,853.1 16,094.1 42,880 438,279.5 10,221.1 
1974 19,841 241,192.3 12,156.3 45, 715 385,316.1 8,428.7 
1975 23,436 203,547.3 8,685.2 51,173 378,516.3 7,396.8 
1976 24,284 226,175.9 9,313.8 53,234 397,119.8 7,459.9 
1977 21,351 210,232.6 9,846.5 51,261 381,215.4 7,436.8 
1978 19,861 235,122.2 11,838.4 49,260 399,504.7 8,110.1 
1979 18,721 199,112.9 10,635.8 48,165 347,723.9 7,219.4 
1980 15,692 135,258.6 8,619.6 45,563 292,112.5 6,411.2 
1981 18,938 126,533.6 6,681.5 44,552 153,276.0 3,440.4 
1982 22,198 108,690.9 4,896.4 39,344 108,973.1 2,769.8 
1983 18,935 131,178.0 6,927.8 35,591 146,320.9 4, 111.2 
1984 19,076 105,329.1 5, 521.5 36,650 140,214.3 3,825.8 
1985 16,821 83,602.6 4,970.1 37,971 127,156.0 3,348.8 
1986 18,326 111,916.7 6,107.0 33,731 135,686.8 4,022.6 
Sources: Gonzalez-Vega (1973) and Banco Hacional de Costa Rica, unpublished records. 
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Table 6. Costa Rica: Banco Hacional de Costa Rica. Proportion of the Hu1ber of 
Loaas and of Outstanding Balances by Departlent. Real Average Loan 
Size bJ Department and their Ratio. 1970-1987. 
COMMERCIAL DEPARTllEHT RURAL DEPARTMENT REAL AVERAGE SIZE 
Year Hu1ber A1ount Hu1ber AIOunt Coaercial Rural C01/Rur 
1970 28.8 58.9 60.2 20.9 26,070 4,432 5.9 
1971 24.8 61.l 45.0 20.0 26,569 4,778 5.6 
1972 20.1 63.2 43.4 19.4 34,058 4,836 7.0 
1973 24.6 67.2 75.4 18.0 61,315 5,370 11.4 
1974 28.6 73.1 71.4 15.3 72,692 6, 110 11. 9 
1975 32.3 78.3 67.7 12.8 78,296 6,122 12.8 
1976 32.7 91.3 59.9 13.7 80,566 6,621 12.2 
1977 38.8 81.0 61.2 11.2 80,710 7,087 11.4 
1978 46.1 82.0 53.9 10.2 79,276 8,416 9.4 
1979 49.7 84.0 50.3 9.3 85,105 9,289 9.2 
1980 54.0 88.2 46.0 7.2 103,086 9,841 10.5 
1981 n.a. 88.7 n.a. 7.4 n.a. 11,470 n.a. 
1982 n.a. 91.1 n.a. 5.8 n.a. 11,875 n.a. 
1983 n.a. 90.8 n.a. 7.2 n.a. 25,994 n.a. 
1984 n.a. 91.3 n.a. 6.6 n.a. 27,146 n.a. 
1985 n.a. 91.3 n.a. 6.5 n.a. 25,578 n.a. 
1986 n.a. 90.6 n.a. 6.9 n.a. 34,450 n.a. 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Co1puted fro1 Banco Hacional de Costa Rica, unpublished records. 
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Table 7. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Annual Real Rates of 
Growth of Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Economic 
Activity <Percentages). 1951-1987. 
Year Total Agriculture Livestock Industry Other ~/ 
1951 17.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1952 27.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1953 16.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1954 2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1.955 8.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1956 12.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1957 18.3 37.4 1. 5 0.1 9.3 
1958 4.3 -1. 8 19.2 9.6 6.1 
1959 21.8 20.2 40.2 30.6 13.5 
1960 10.4 11. 3 18.6 13.9 3.3 
1961 3.9 0.7 7.2 18.5 0.5 
1962 4.8 -1.0 8.7 16.5 5.6 
1963 20.8 19.8 4.4 20.6 33.1 
1964 13.7 8.1 16.1 23.8 14.5 
1965 13.2 11. 4 25.8 18.5 6.0 
1966 -0.1 1. 2 5.7 -4.8 -2.5 
1967 2.2 -4.2 9.3 11. 0 0.7 
1968 0.8 -1.0 9.6 3.0 -4.6 
1969 1.6 -1.4 10.4 7.2 -5.6 
1970 8.0 9.2 8.0 10.1 4.7 
1971 23.6 6.9 31.4 10.3 51. 7 
1972 5.0 -6.8 10.9 8.2 10.2 
1973 -11.8 -22.3 2.1 4.2 -24.8 
1974 3.1 -6.9 -6.7 20.2 9.2 
1975 17.3 27.6 -0.1 19.3 25.4 
1976 12.1 18.5 9.4 9.9 11. 2 
1977 9.7 0.4 8.9 13.4 14.7 
1978 13.5 15.3 7.6 15.4 15.0 
1979 -3.4 -11.4 -4.4 -9.8 8.7 
1980 -5.7 -1.4 -2.8 -14.5 -3.6 
1981 -49.5 -41.1 -53.3 -49.7 -52.1 
1982 -22.5 -13.7 -13.0 -14.4 -40.4 
1983 43.0 63.2 48.0 54.2 5.9 
1984 5.5 -8.4 9.9 16.1 8.0 
1985 7.1 -10.3 -1. 5 18.8 25.1 
1986 4.8 -8.6 -2.8 2.9 28.8 
1987 10.4 6.2 -11.8 10.5 30.0 
~/ Includes: Commerce, electricity, services, housing, personal 
credit, credit to foreigners and unclassified credit. 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito 
Y. Cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by 
the Wholesale Price Index. 
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Table 8. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of 
Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Economic Activity 
<Percentages>. 1950-1987. 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Agriculture 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
40.l 
46.6 
43.9 
43.3 
43.6 
42.3 
39.9 
39.6 
37.7 
37.1 
37.5 
35.2 
34.6 
33.5 
33.9 
29.3 
26.0 
22.9 
20.7 
22.5 
23.8 
21.8 
22.1 
20.3 
21.2 
24.7 
27.5 
31.4 
27.3 
22.9 
19.9 
19.2 
Livestock 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
13.7 
11. 7 
13.4 
15.4 
16.6 
17.1 
17.7 
15.3 
15.6 
17.4 
18.4 
19.7 
21.4 
23.2 
23.2 
24.7 
26.1 
30.2 
27.3 
23.3 
22.7 
22.6 
21.4 
21. 2 
21.8 
20.2 
22.6 
23.4 
24.4 
22.4 
20.8 
16.6 
Industry 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12.4 
10.4 
11. 0 
11. 8 
12.1 
13.8 
15.4 
15.4 
16.7 
17.5 
16.7 
18.1 
18.5 
19.5 
19.9 
17.8 
18.3 
21. 7 
25.3 
25.7 
25.2 
26.0 
26.5 
24.7 
22.4 
22.3 
24.6 
26.6 
29.2 
32.4 
31. 8 
31. 9 
Other ~/ 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
33.8 
31. 2 
31. 7 
29.6 
27.7 
26.8 
27.0 
29.7 
30.0 
28.0 
27.4 
27.0 
25.5 
23.7 
23.0 
28.2 
29.6 
25.2 
26.7 
28.5 
28.3 
29.6 
30.0 
33.8 
34.6 
32.8 
25.2 
18.7 
19.1 
22.3 
27.4 
32.3 
~I Includes: Commerce, electricity, services, housing, 
personal credit, credit to foreigners and unclassified 
credit. 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
Amounts deflated by the Wholesale Price Index. 
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Table 9. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Annual Real Growth 
Rates of New Loans Granted <Percentages>. 1974-1987. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total Agriculture Livestock Industry Commerce Other ~/ 
10.1 
7.0 
4.4 
1.1 
10.1 
-8.1 
-20.2 
-26.3 
-7.3 
17.6 
-13.0 
-11. l 
26.9 
14.8 
8.1 
17.7 
-1.1 
-9.6 
8.9 
-11.5 
-6.8 
-8.2 
20.3 
17.2 
-19.5 
-34.7 
28.7 
14.8 
-14.5 
-25.9 
17.9 
21.4 
6.9 
-3.0 
-12.3 
-44.6 
29.1 
7.9 
-22.9 
-53.9 
44.1 
14.8 
26.3 
5.4 
-2.3 
3.7 
9.0 
-32.0 
-32.5 
-28.9 
13.7 
29.2 
1.0 
14.9 
7.5 
14.8 
126.1 
12.6 
-17.6 
-15.2 
6.9 
72.9 
-7.1 
-35.9 
-42.9 
1. 8 
54.7 
46.2 
40.2 
14.8 
-0.8 
21.4 
19.8 
1.7 
15.0 
7.6 
-27.0 
-26.6 
-57.5 
17.0 
-28.3 
18.5 
54.8 
14.8 
Source: Same as Table 10. 
Table 10. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of New 
Loans Granted During the Year <Percentages>. 1970-1987. 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977-
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total Agriculture Li~estock Industry Commerce Other ~/ 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
24.8 
24.3 
26.7 
25.3 
22.6 
22.4 
21.6 
25.2 
31.4 
40.7 
40.6 
37.6 
27.6 
28.0 
28.0 
20.8 
16.1 
11.2 
12.6 
15.1 
14.7 
15.5 
17.1 
12.8 
17.8 
16.4 
14.5 
7.5 
8.5 
8.5 
29.4 
33.7 
33.2 
31.0 
31. 8 
31. 5 
23.3 
19.7 
19.0 
23.4 
25.7 
29.8 
38.5 
32.6 
32.6 
2.8 
5.8 
6.1 
4.8 
4.0 
3.9 
7.4 
8.6 
7.5 
4.6 
4.0 
7.1 
11. 7 
12.9 
12.9 
22.3 
20.1 
22.8 
26.2 
26.3 
27.5 
32.2 
29.5 
29.3 
13.5 
13.4 
11.0 
14.7 
18.0 
18.0 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
~/ Includes: Electricity, services, housing, personal credit, credit 
to foreigners and unclassified credit. 
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! Table 11. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Interest ' . ; 
and Non-Interest Farmers' Borrowing Cost l <Percentages) 1983. 
. I 
Interest Average Annualized Cost of 
Rate Cost Av. Cost Funds 
Loan Size 
Less than 101000 12.2 22.5 37.1 49.3 
101001 to 501000 12.5 6.9 12.6 25.1 
501001 to 1001000 13.4 2.9 4.4 17.8 
1001001 to 5001000 15.6 2.4 2.8 18.4 
More than 500,000 20.1 2.9 3.4 23.5 
End Use of the Loan 
Export Crops 15.6 4.9 5.2 20.8 
Basic Grains 12.7 11.5 26.0 38.8 
Other Crops 12.1 5.1 8.1 20.2 
Livestock 15.8 6.8 7.0 22.9 
Interest Rate 
Less than 12% 12.0 7.7 13.7 25.7 
15% 15.0 3.8 3.9 18.9 
18-29% 18.4 4.4 4.4 22.8 
22-26.5% 23.2 3.3 4.5 27.7 
Deeartment 
Commercial 18.1 3.7 4.2 22.2 
Rural 12.0 7.9 13.9 26.0 
Educational Level 
No Education 12.8 12.1 19.4 32.2 
Primary School 13.1 8.8 15.4 28.1 
High School 14.0 4.5 5.7 19.7 
University 17.3 3.0 3.7 21.0 
Default Record 
Yes 13.7 8.1 14.5 25.3 
No 12.8 6.1 10.0 23.9 
Checking Account 
Yes 17.8 3.3 3.9 21.7 
No 12.7 7.5 13.0 25.7 
Savings Account 
Yes 14.1 4.0 5.5 19.6 
No 13.4 7.7 13.4 26.8 
Source: Gonzalez-Gari ta ( 1986) . 
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Table 12. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Financial 
Intermediation Costs <Million CR$>. Revenues and 
Costs as a proportion of Effective Mobilization 
<Percentages>. 1985. 
Total Mobilization ~/ 
Actual Reserves ~/ 
Effective Mobilization 
Interest and Commissions Accrued 
Non-Financial Lending Cost 
Expected Net Lending Revenue 
Defaulted Interest 
Effective Net Lending Revenue 
Interest and Commissions Paid 
Non-Financial Mobilization Cost 
Total Mobilization Cost 
Gross Effective Profits ~/ 
Reserve Against Default 
Depreciation Reserve 
Layoff Reserve 
Net Effective Profits after Reserves 
Expected Intermediation Margin 
Effective Intermediation Margin 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs ' 
plus Defaulted Interest 
AMOUNT 
23,746.3 
3,640.7 
--------
20,105.7 
--------
--------
3,685.3 
833.2 
--------
2,852.0 
769.0 
--------
2,083.1 
--------
--------
2,062.8 
441.4 
--------
2,504.2 
--------
<421.1) 
425.0 
21.2 
27.4 
--------
(894.7) 
--------
--------
1,622.5 
853.S 
1,274.6 
2,043.S 
PERCENTAGE 
100.0 
15.3 
--------
84.7 
--------
18.3 
4.1 
--------
14.2 
3.8 
--------
10.4 
--------
10.3 
2.2 
--------
12.S 
--------
( 2 .1) 
2.1 
0.1 
0.1 
--------
<4.4) 
--------
--------
8.1 
4.2 
6.3 
10.2 
~/ Average of outstanding daily balances of all funds mobilized 
<Deposits from the public, Bonds placed with the public, Loans 
and Rediscounts from the Central Banks, and Foreign Loans>. 
~/ Average daily balances of actual reserves held by the bank. 
£1 Effective net lending revenue - Total mobilization costs. 
Source: Gonzalez-Garita (1987). 
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